k PRELIMINARY STUDY OF 
riHE ADMINISTRATIVE POLITY 



OF NAPOLEON I 



ei >'^ 



By 
VICTOR COFFIN 



REPRINTED FROM THE 



gtmmati pfetorfal §mm 



Vol. XIII., NO. 4 



JULY, 1908 



-L [Reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol. XIII., No. 4, July, 1908.] 

*> 

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLITY OF NAPOLEON I.^ 

It is somewhat remarkable that while Napoleon Bonaparte has 
always been recognized as the chief architect of the modern French 
state, his plans and specifications, so to speak, and the actual process 
of his direction of the construction, have been as yet but slightly 
studied. The general effect has been closely examined and vari- 
ously appraised, and certain phases, such as the church, education, 
finance and industry, have been subjected to expert scrutiny; but I 
am not aware of any thorough and comprehensive inquiry into the 
principles and practices of general administration from the point of 
view of the shaping of the new institutions. Yet such an inquiry 
must be admitted to be essential to the comprehension both of the 
man and of his work. 

I am not unmindful of the careful attention that has frequently 
been given to the fundamental documents of the new regime. But 
here, as so often in the study of the history of institutions, it seems; 
necessary to call attention to the importance of closely following the 
daily executive interpretation of such documents, the daily course 
of their application in connection with the problems of civil govern- 
ment. Institutions are after all manipulated by men and for men, 
and when we lose sight of this flesh-and-blood element, we deal only 
with dry bones. It is through the constant contact of these bones 
with flesh and blood that the body's habit and action, the organic 
life, is determined. From this point of view I have entered on the 
study of the aims and methods of Napoleon Bonaparte in the ad- 
ministration of the government of France and of their working out 
in civil institutions. 

Napoleon is one of the great administrators of all time, and his 

^ The material made use of in this paper is drawn from the authorized Corre- 
spondance de Napoleon /«"" (Paris, 1858-1870, 32 vols.), with the supplements of 
Lecestre, Napoleon ler^ Lettres Iwedites, an VIII-1815 (Paris, 1897, 2 vols.), and 
De Brotonne, Lettres Inedites de Napoleon I. (Paris, 1898) and Dernieres Lettres 
Inedites de Napoleon I. (Paris, 1903, 2 vols.), from the Rondonneau Collection of 
imprimes in the Archives Nationales, from the cartons of the Arch. Nat. entitled 
" Journaux du Cabinet de I'Empereur, an VIII-181S " (AF IV. 909), and " Dictees 
de I'Empereur au Ministre Sec. d'fitat, an XII-181S " (AF IV. 910), and from 
the registres containing the " Proces-verbaux des Seances des Consuls, 1800-1804" 
(AF* IV. 3-15). The authorized Correspondance will be referred to as Corr., 
the supplements under the names of the editors. 

( 753 ) 



754 Vict 07^ Coffin 

work crystallizes the results of the most striking period of transi- 
tion in modern history; a close study of the progress of that work 
seems to me the most effective way of dealing with the problems 
of the meaning and results of the French Revolution, and of the 
relations to it and to the Old Regime of modern France and modern 
Europe. The present brief paper aims to do little more than set 
forth certain preliminaries to such a study; it is concerned with 
principles and purposes rather than achievements, and deals with 
only certain phases of the spirit and tendencies of the Napoleonic 
government. For the most part, I have left Napoleon to speak for 
himself, and have neglected, as often open to suspicion, most of his 
public utterances, and all statements and explanations made apart 
from the course of normal civil administration. I have therefore 
confined myself to such more or less confidential communications 
as can hardly be supposed to have been affected by the idea of pub- 
licity, present or future ; for lack of space I have left aside for the 
present all legislative work. The confidential communications used 
are, it will be noticed, for the most part such as present administra- 
tive decisions ; they represent therefore not only what Napoleon 
said but what he did. In grouping them I have aimed to confine 
myself to two general aspects: (i) the enunciation or indication 
by Napoleon of political principles or administrative methods; (2) 
the legality or constitutionality of his regime. And I should be the 
first to concede that the material presented is quite fragmentary, 
that for the most part it raises questions without furnishing those 
conclusive answers that can rest alone on more extended work. 

I. 

It is not possible, I think, to present any comprehensive view of 
society or politics from the utterances of Napoleon ; but the student 
will hardly doubt that he not only had the born ruler's intuition, but 
had reflected deeply on the general problems of government. Both 
intuition and reflection doubtless lie behind a couple of interesting 
remarks on the Art of Ruling that belong to the year 1804. They 
are made to Fouche, to whom on September 9 he writes with respect 
to a recent production by Barere entitled Lettre a I'Armee; he says 
that he has not read it as it was both improper and futile, and that 
Barere, " dont les declamations et les sophismes ne sont pas en 
harmonic avec sa colossale reputation ", is to be warned not to 
meddle with such matters. " II croit toujours ", adds Napoleon, 
" qu'il faut animer les masses ; il f aut, au contraire, les diriger sans 
qu'elles s'en apergoivent." ^ 

' Correspondance, IX. 511. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 755 

A few weeks later he remarks, a propos of the " amnisties " 
(probably the returned emigres), "Dans les gouvernements, il faut 
de la consequence; du moment qu'on admet un individu a faire 
partie de I'ordre politique, il doit en posseder tous les droits. . . . 
L'art des gouvernements est de punir les mechants, mais de recom- 
penser les honnetes gens. . . . Le principe general est de tenir tout 
en surveillance, et de faire des exceptions en faveur de ceux qui se 
comportent bien."^ This observation has a collateral interest, and 
suggests the remark that Napoleon was not always able to display 
that " consequence " which he recognized as a prime virtue of the 
ruler; in regard to the emigres, for example, he might seem to have 
spoiled his own work in large degree by failing to follow up his 
early generous and statesmanlike policy. But instead of causing us 
simply to view Napoleon's professions with suspicion, this should 
perhaps lead us to recognize what is often ignored : that the concilia- 
tory advances of the new government were for the most part futile, 
that it was forced constantly to regard itself as surrounded by ir- 
reconcilable enemies, and that from this and other causes the admin- 
istrative conditions never became entirely normal. 

The memoirs and other personal fragments of this period fre- 
quently represent Napoleon as discoursing freely on revolutionary 
questions and on his own position in France. Such records unfor- 
tunately are open to much suspicion from the uncertainty both as 
to Napoleon's immediate object or dramatic instinct, and as to the 
narrator's good faith or good memory. It is but rarely that direct 
reference is made to such fundamental matters in the administrative 
correspondence. The first instance is perhaps in 1802, when he 
begins the life consulship with the declaration to the Senate that 
" Le suffrage du peuple m'a investi de la supreme magistrature. Je 
ne me croirais pas assure de sa confiance, si I'acte qui m'y retiendrait 
n'etait encore sanctionne par son suffrage." * When his dignity was 
made imperial and hereditary, his public language shows the change, 
and he declares to the Senate, April 25, 1804, " Nous avons ete 
constamment guides par cette grande verite : que la souverainete 
reside dans le Peuple frangais, en ce sens que tout, tout sans excep- 
tion, doit etre fait pour son interet, pour son bonheur et pour sa 
gloire,"^ It is evident that this guarded statement may mean no 
more than the motto of Frederick the Great's despotism, " I am the 
first servant of the State ", and the purport of it will be the more 
evident when it is remembered that it occurs in the response to that 

^Corr,, X. IS, 
* Ihid., VII. 460. 
» Ihid., IX. 341. 



75^ Victor Coffin 

address in which the Senate had declared that " II faut que la liberte 
et I'egalite soient sacres, que le pacte social ne puisse pas etre viole, 
que la souverainete du peuple ne soit jamais meconnue, et que la 
nation ne soit jamais force de ressaisir sa puissance et venger sa 
majeste outragee."® By 1812 the Emperor seems to have reached 
the point of open hostility to the idea of popular sovereignty, or 
perhaps rather to any expression of that idea, for on December 20 
he breaks out in his reply to an address of the Council of State : 

C'est a I'ideologie, a cette tenebreuse metaphysique qui, en recher- 
chant avec subtilite les causes premieres, veut sur ces bases fonder la 
legislation des peuples, au lieu d'approprier les lois a la connaissance du 
coeur humain et aux lemons de I'histoire, qu'il faut attribuer tous les 
malheurs qu'a eprouves notre belle France. Ces erreurs devaient et 
ont effectivement amene le regime des hommes de sang. En effet, qui 
a proclame le principe d'insurrection comme un devoir? qui a adule le 
peuple en le proclamant a une souverainete qu'il etait incapable d'ex- 
ercer? qui a detruit le respect et la saintete des lois, en les faisant 
dependre, non des principes sacres de la justice, de la nature des choses 
et de la justice civile, mais seulement de la volonte d'une assemblee 
composee d'hommes etrangers a la connaissance des lois civiles, crimi- 
nelles, administratives, politiques et militaires?^ 

It is not necessary for me to delay upon the character and his- 
tory of the representative bodies of the Napoleonic period ; it is 
probably just enough to regard them as innocuous if not farcical. 
The Emperor's real attitude with respect to parliamentary represen- 
tation is probably accurately expressed in a note for Cambaceres, 
October 28, 1809, by the remark with reference to the Corps Legis- 
latif , " Aucun corps ne pent se dire representant de la nation. 
Toutes les autorites la representent egalement."^ We can hardly 
doubt that Napoleon dreaded the institution and resented its claims, 
and we cannot be surprised that he should have both dreaded and 
resented claims so closely identified with ten years of excess and 
disaster. And in judging his attitude toward alike the theory of 
popular sovereignty and its expression in parliamentary institutions, 
we must remember (as Napoleon III. urged) that government in 
his brief reign can hardly be looked at as ever reaching normal con- 
ditions, and that he might well have continued to believe throughout 
the most of it that the task of establishing order and winning men 
from the revolutionary temper and from the dangerous brooding on 
revolutionary ideas and activities, would be fatally hampered by 
freedom of political association and agitation. We have evidence 
that Napoleon as an observer of the revolutionary popular move- 

• March zj, 1804. 

•' Corr., XXIV. 343- ^ 

*Ihid.. XX. 16. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 757 

ments had received impressions that left him somewhat nervous 
with respect to such movements. Some peculiarities in his treat- 
ment of Paris were largely the result of this sentiment, and its 
existence probably had much to do with his constant vigilance as 
to Parisian and provincial public spirit and with his unremitting 
efforts to repress all mediums of the interchange of ideas on public 
affairs. 

But whether or not he were permanently or only temporarily 
hostile to representative government, he recognized the necessity of 
keeping constantly in touch with public opinion and of remaining 
the exponent of national feeling. In this way he represents clearly 
one of the great changes that had come about, the larger place taken 
by public opinion and national sentiment. He undoubtedly looked 
upon himself as receiving his power from or with the approval of 
the nation, and as remaining dependent upon that approval ; that he 
ever felt himself to be in the position of the hated tyrant, to be 
estranged in spirit from and physically set over against his people, 
I do not believe. In this connection one might quote some sen- 
tences in a note for Cambaceres of August 2, 1809. After speak- 
ing of the inadvisability of " les choses masquees " in administra- 
tion, he goes on to sweep away the artificial construction of the 
" imperial domain " as composed of " contributions levees sur 
I'ennemi " with the remark that " cette affectation si positive d'une 
chose appartenant a I'Empereur et non a la nation etait un peu trop 
tranchante, car I'Empereur ne fait la guerre qu'avec les moyens et 
I'argent de la nation." And he adds : 

Toutes les fois que dans une loi ou senatus-consulte on voudra donner 
a TEmpereur des proprietes autres que sa liste civile et ses acquisitions, 
on trouvera des embarras et des contrarietes. Mais toutes les fois qu'on 
le chargera d'administrer ou de reglementer telle partie, on sera d'accord. 
, . . L'Empereur ne pent donner un seul arpent du domaine national, ni 
meme du domaine de sa liste civile, fitablir le contraire ce serait aller 
contre tous les principes.* 

This recognition of the identity of crown and people should be 
viewed in the light of his efforts in various ways to get into and 
keep in touch with the nation. He was determined to retain con- 
trol as well as initiative, and to crush every effort at popular agita- 
tion ; but he was also sincerely anxious to get such information and 
advice as would enable him to act in the general interest. This is, 
I think, the predominant idea in the institution of the senatoreries, 
through which a number of the senators (who were constitutionally 
excluded from open political or administrative activity) were peri- 

"Corr., XIX. 295. 



75 8 Victor Coffin 

odically employed in secret investigations of conditions in specific 
territories; as explained by Regnaud in 1803 to the Corps Legis- 
latif, this institution was intended to aid in bringing the Senate 
closer to the nation, in placing before the .government the public 
needs and ideas, and in enabling the public to know " la veritable 
pensee du gouvernement "/" The same purpose was claimed in the 
institution of the Legion of Honor, which is referred to in the Min- 
utes of the Council of State of the 25 Floreal an X as " une insti- 
tution politique qui place dans la societe des intermediaires par les- 
quels les actes du pouvoir sont traduits a I'opinion avec fidelite et 
bienveillance, et par lesquels I'opinion pent remonter jusq'au pou- 
voir." 11 

These facts should be kept in mind when we reflect upon the 
well-known process of the purging of the Tribunate and Senate 
and the final suppression *of the former. The Corps Legislatif 
was not so much interfered with ; that Napoleon, however, can- 
not justly be accused of holding out false hopes to it may be 
seen from the expressions used when, on the 24 Frimaire an 
XII, the Senate decreed new regulations for its organization 
and operation. One of these was that the First Consul should 
appoint the annual president (formerly elected monthly) from can- 
didates nominated to him by the assembly ; in stating the reasons for 
this change Regnaud declared that the government encouraged all 
communications from the Corps Legislatif, and aimed to assure to 
it " la liberte d'une discussion eclairee ... la iaculte d'adresser 
au Gouvernement I'expression de ses sentiments, le resultat de ses 
pensees, de maniere a eclairer, encourager sa marche, sans pouvoir 
la retarder et I'arreter jamais ; et il lui laisse tout entiere I'obligation 
de se soumettre au regulateur souverain qui commande a toutes les 
autorites et balance tous. les pouvoirs, a I'opinion publique." ^^ 

It seems clear from all this that Napoleon looked upon the 
central representative institutions as proper (in at least the condi- 
tions then confronting government in France) only to furnish light 
to an all-powerful and responsible executive. It is not to be ex- 
pected that he would view otherwise the functions of the represen- 
tative bodies that acted locally. In considering these we perhaps 
need not stop to distinguish between the advisory councils of the 
communes, arrondissements and departments, occupied with ques- 
tions of local administration, and the electoral colleges in the arron- 
dissements and departments that took the place of the original " lists 

"Archives Nationals, AD XVIIIi^. 314- 
"/bid., VI. 80. 
^^bid., XVIII ^ 314. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 759 

of notabilities " ; there is little difference with respect to popular 
election (practically excluded after 1802), and all, as composed of 
residents, are alike representative of local public opinion and inter- 
ests. None of these local organs appears to us as dangerous, but 
yet we find Napoleon exercising constant vigilance in their regard. 
September 17, 1801, he comments upon the unsatisfactory character 
of the recent sessions of the departmental councils, as wholly occu- 
pied with local and personal matters, and declares that in the next 
session it will be necessary " de leur indiquer, par une instruction, 
les objets principaux sur lesquels doivent porter leurs delibera- 
tions "." 

If it is natural to suspect that he is simply seeking a pretext for 
increasing the subjection of these bodies, we must at least concede 
that he drew a line with regard to the kind of control, for on May 
24, 1804, he expresses strongly his disapproval of the intimidating 
action of one of the military commanders in regard to an electoral 
college, and especially " qu'une assemblee toute civile ait ete en- 
vironnee de troupes ". He informs the Minister of the Interior, to 
whom he is writing, that " Les maximes du Gouvernement sont 
entierement contraires a cette mesure ; il ne desire regner que par 
la confiance, et il n'a jamais voulu qu'on put mettre des bornes a la 
libre expression des citoyens appeles aux f onctions electorales." ^* 
In March, 1805, after the institution of the Legion of Honor and 
the provision for the ex-officio sitting of legionaries in the electoral 
colleges, he writes to confine to one-tenth the proportion of such 
njembers.^^ His constant care to prevent the development of a 
dangerous public spirit through these assemblies is shown, March 
27, 1805, in his directions to the Minister of the Interior with respect 
to the convocation of the cantonal ones. Contiguous departments 
are not to be allowed to hold such meetings at the same time ; " Le 
ministre fera un rapport sur I'esprit qui a anime I'annee derniere 
les colleges qui viennent d'etre convoques, afin que Ton puisse, en 
usant de la prerogative qui appartient a I'Empereur, retablir I'equi- 
libre." ^^ In the following year there were issued new " Instructions 
pour Messieurs les Presidents des Colleges filectoraux ", in which 
it is directed that " le college ne peut directement ni indirectement 
sous quelque pretexte que ce soit, correspondre avec un autre col- 
lege, sous peine de dissolution."^'' 

" Corr., VII. 254. 

^*Ibid., IX. 370. 

^^Ibid., X. 203. 

^"Ibid., X. 265. 

"Arch. Nat. AD I. 73. '■ 



760 Victor Coffin 

This is, of course, only a part of a general policy of repression 
with respect to public movements or expressions of public spirit 
that has been frequently dwelt upon. It is true that June 7, 1800, 
Napoleon wrote from Italy to the other consuls in disapproval of 
the suppression of a journal for reflections on the Institute, and 
remarks, " il doit regner la plus grande liberte " ;^® but this temper 
did not last long and all that remained of journalism was placed 
soon under a reign of terror. Official displeasure was constantly 
visited on any sign of appealing to the public through the press in 
regard to public affairs. March 26, 1806, the Emperor requests the 
Minister to inform the Chambers of Commerce that " la voie 
la plus inconvenante et la plus inefficace de faire parvenir a Sa 
Majeste ou des vues, ou des representations, est celle de I'impres- 
sion. Une chose imprimee, par cela meme qu'elle est un appel a 
I'opinion, n'en est plus un a I'autorite."^^ In a letter to Champagny, 
Minister of the Interior, April 26, 1806, with respect to a municipal 
official whom the prefect had charged with insubordination, he 
declares that the charge could be regarded as serious only if the 
accused had published his remonstrance, in which act would lie " son 
tort le plus reel ".^° About the same time he announces limitations 
on the access to the government of deputations, declaring that they 
could be sent only by the electoral colleges or by the municipal and 
departmental councils, acting in a prescribed way. In June of the 
same year he writes to Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, " Mon 
fils, il faut imprimer peu. . . . En general, le moins que vous ferez 
imprimer sera le mieux."^^ 

The subject of local representative institutions suggests the large 
topic of local autonomy vs. centralization. This issue can hardly 
be said to be raised directly in official communications, and, as we 
should expect, the whole trend was toward a centralization which 
at that time might well have appeared the only promising line of 
development. But yet we have some evidence that Napoleon was 
not wholly responsible for the excess of this development or blind 
to its dangers. If we can rely on a note dictated by him to Lucien 
Bonaparte when appointed Minister of the Interior at the beginning 
of the consulate, Napoleon began his administration strongly con- 
vinced of the evils of excessive centralization and anxious to main- 
tain considerable local autonomy. The note^^ refers with approval 

"Com, VI. 343. "^Ihid., XII. 218. 

"^Ihid., XII. 311. "/birf., XII. 478. 

^ Ihid., VI. so. The document is published in the official Correspondance 
as an extract from the ^cole des Communes ; no treatise of this title appears else- 
where. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 761 

to the early revolutionary policy in regard to the communes, says 
that since 1790 the commune that before had belonged to the seig- 
neur and the priest had been " une veritable personne, ayant droit 
de posseder, d'acquerir ", but adds that since 1790 also these 36,000 
communes had been pillaged by the government, that in ten years 
more they would be reduced to beggary, and that it is the duty of 
the minister to avert an evil " qui porterait la gangrene dans ces 
trente-six mille membres du grand corps social ". An inventory is 
therefore to be made with special reference to communal conditions, 
and every official effort is to be given to preserving the biens coni- 
munaux and to general improvement ; ten years of such a regime 
would, it is predicted, leave in France only " communes ayant des 
ressources disponibles ", and the general movement of prosperity 
given to the country by the activity of thirty-six million individuals 
would be multiplied " par la puissance amelioratrice de trente-six 
mille individualites communales agissant toutes sous la haute direc- 
tion du Gouvernement ". 

This last clause, it will be noticed, is somewhat ominous; the 
extent and the exact method of the exercise of " la haute direction " 
were probably not easily determined, for there followed a good deal 
of experimentation with respect to the supervision of the communes. 
The constitutional changes of 1802 and 1804 greatly advanced the 
process of stifling local initiative and freedom of action ; it is hence 
rather surprising to find on October 27, 1804, a doubt addressed by 
Napoleon to the Council of State with reference to the project of 
making maires and their ad joints a part of the municipal councils. 
'' Comment ", he asks, " accorde-t-on cette mesure avec le droit de 
surveillance du conseil sur I'administration de la municipalite ? " "^ 
And it was not until June 4, 1806, that it* was declared by decree 
that for the future the maire should sit in and preside over the 
council.-* 

The treatment of the communal properties in the later years of 
the Empire was no doubt in large degree the natural or inevitable 
result of Napoleon's financial difficulties ; for the policy outlined with 
such enthusiasm in 1800, there is substituted an effort to shift public 
"burdens from the central to the local administrations, and to appro- 
priate for the state the resources of the communal lands. A note 
for the Minister of the Interior, September 17, 1810, dwells on the 
desirability of thus increasing the communal obligations, declares 
that the communes " sont, en general, trop riches " and are extrav- 

=^Com, X. 36. 

^* These councils it will be remembered were nominated by the prefects. 

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XIII. — $0. 



762 Victor Co fin 

agantly managed, the maires (who ought not to be paid at all) 
sometimes receiving more than the prefects ; the minister is there- 
fore directed to prepare a project for a law under which the com- 
munes should abandon to the state one-half of the octrois in order 
that direct taxation might be reduced. We find Napoleon carried 
on in this direction even beyond the docility of the Council of State ; 
for June 26, 1813, he writes from Dresden to the imperial arch- 
chancellor, Cambaceres,-^ that if the council continues to retard by 
a " foule de questions contentieuses " the sale of the communal 
properties the matter is to be removed from it altogether and man- 
aged by the Arch-Chancellor, the Minister of Justice and the Grand 
Judge. He declares that the communes are to be left only " les 
objets d'agrement ". That this, however, was an exceptional war- 
measure is indicated by the remark : " II importe, dans la situation 
actuelle des affaires, de soutenir le Tresor; tout le reste est indif- 
ferent." This step is further pushed on in a letter to Gaudin, Min- 
ister of Finance, of the following July;-® he asks for the names of 
the departments in which communal properties have not already been 
taken possession of, and adds that, as the new financial arrangements 
will now enable these also to be sold, the process is to be extended 
to them.^^ 

This summary of Napoleon's treatment of the principle and 
practice of popular sovereignty will show how far he had wandered 
from the rationalistic positions of the men of the eighteenth century 
and of the Revolution, and may seem to justify Taine's remark that 
he entertained only disgust for the revolutionary ideas and prin- 
ciples. But a very little investigation shows that this is distinctly 
something less than a half-truth. Without going fully into the 
question of how far Napoleon really shared the revolutionary ideas 
or how far he consciously carried on or opposed the revolutionary 
work, I will point out some evidence of a consistent effort on his 
part to identify himself and his regime with the previous epoch. It 
is, of course, advisable to formulate a general caution as to the 
degree in which he may be suspected of simply echoing the current 
or lately prevailing cant; it is probably true that he was slow in 
emancipating himself from the idea that it was advisable to use it. 
But with the fullest allowance of this kind it must still, I think, be 
concluded that Napoleon Bonaparte so far continued to share the 

-^ Lecestre, II. 253. 

"' Corr., XXV. 477. 

^ The large question of the hiens communaux is only touched on in the above 
remarks. Many other elements were involved ; but an adequate discussion of 
them is at present impossible. 



The Administratwe Polity of Napoleo7i I. 763 

revolutionary attitude and uphold the revolutionary work as to set 
him and his g-overnment at a long distance from the Old Regime, 

The revolutionary abolition of feudal obstacles to the well-being 
of the masses and to the effective use by the state of the national 
resources, is frequently referred to by Napoleon with the most em- 
phatic approval; in this, however, both he and the revolutionists 
were only in line with the policy of the eighteenih-century enlight- 
ened absolutism. July 18, 1801, the consuls issued a proclamation 
" aux habitants des quatre departements de la rive gauche du 
Rhin ", in which the newly incorporated Alsatians and Lorrainers 
are forcibly reminded of all they had won. 

Des privileges odieux n'enchainent plus I'industrie des ouvriers; le 
gibier ne ravage plus les champs du cultivateur, ne devore plus les 
fruits de son travail ; pour tous ont cesse d'avilissantes corvees ; pour 
tous a cesse la degradation des servitudes feodales. 

La dime est abolie; les contributions de tous genres sont adoucies; 
les perceptions sont egalement reparties entre les terres du seigneur 
ou de Tecclesiastique ci-devant exempts de charges, et celles du par- 
ticulier qui les supportait seul; les douanes interieures qui se rencon- 
traient au passage d'une contree a une autre, ou empechaient de remonter 
les rivieres, sont supprimees. 

Une justice impartiale, des administrations regulieres sont substi- 
tuees a I'autorite arbitraire des baillis."^ 

On January 19, 1803, Napoleon questions the Minister of Justice 
with respect to the full abolition of feudal conditions in these depart- 
ments and in the Netherlands.-^ It has been frequently pointed out 
that the extension of his power was always marked by these changes, 
and it is not now necessary for me to delay on the fact that 
the application of such measures was apparently in course of modi- 
fication at one time in the later years of the Empire in the interests 
of the revenue.^" For at the end of 181 1 we find adherence to the 

-^Corr., VII. 198. 

-Uhid., VIII. 183. 

'" I refer here to a phase of this matter on which my material is as yet 
incomplete and which is not represented at all, I think, in the published docu- 
ments. The carton of the National Archives entitled " Journaux du Cabinet de 
I'Empereur, an VIII-1815 " (AF IV. 909) contains the following "Note dictee 
par I'Empereur au Prince Cambaceres du 9 novembre 1810": 

" Sa Majeste desire que le Prince Cambaceres fasse venir pres de lui MM. 
les Comtes Treilhard et Merlin, confere avec eux sur les objets ci-apres 
et presente a S. M. les idees sur les mesures qu'on peut etre dans le cas d'adopter. 

" Le systeme feodal a ete aboli en France. II ne peut etre question de 
revenir sur cette partie de notre legislation pour ce qui concerne I'ancienne France 
et les pays anciennement reunis. Doit-elle etre appliquee aux Departemens de 
hollande? a ceux des £tats romains? a ceux de la Toscane ? et ne peut-on pas 
aussi en excepter Ceux de Piemont, si I'etat des choses le permet encore? Cet 
objet est tres digne d'attention. le resultat de la Suppression des Droits feodaux 



764 Victor Coffin 

revolutionary principles sufficiently set forth anew in the decree for 
the abolition of the feudal regime in the newly-incorporated North- 
west Germany. ^^ 

An emphatic general approval of the nationalizing effects of 
the revolutionary measures is contained in a letter of the First Con- 
sul to Cambaceres, November 3, 1802. It is written from Rouen 
and dwells on the good conditions prevailing in the town. 

Sa prosperite s'est accrue d'un tiers depuis 1788. II y a dans tout 
ce departement un attachement au Gouvernement, franc et degage de 
toute autre pensee. On y retrouve les avantages de ce systeme de 1789 
qui avait arme la nation entiere et I'avait reunie dans le meme mouve- 
ment. Depuis le negociant ou le fabricant le plus riche, et qui, pendant 
la revolution, ont eu le plus la reputation d'aristocratie, jusqu'au dernier 
homme du peuple, ils sont tous reunis.^'^ 

In 1803 we find the First Consul vigorously denouncing a book 
that had defamed the Revolution and being led by the incident to 
increase the stringency of the press censorship. ^^ In 1807 he writes 
to the president of the Section of the Interior of the Council of 
State to condemn an order against the civilian bearing of arms 
issued by a military commander engaged in suppressing brigandage ; 
he points out the lack of authority of either a military commander 
or a prefect to so restrict the rights of the citizen, and concludes 
with language that under more public conditions would be open to 
suspicion : " Tout noble etait autrefois en possession de ce droit ; 
aujourd'hui tout Frangais domicilie, tout citoyen qui, dans son ex- 
dans ces pays serait en meme tems, une perte considerable pour I'Etat et la 
ruine de beaucoup de Particuliers, Sans aucune autre motif et sans aucune autre 
avantage que de depouiller Ceux qui jouissent pour liberer les debiteurs des 
obligations qui leur ont ete imposees de tout tems. Un rapport est necessaire 
pour concilier avee le Code napoleon les modifications qu'il convient de faire de 
nos lois dans ces differents pays. Deja le Conseil d'Etat, en deliberant sur les lois 
a publier dans les Departemens de la Hollande s'est refuse a comprendre dans la 
Nomenclature proposee les lois sur la suppression des Droits feodaux. II y a 
sur cet objet essentiel un travail tres utile a faire. En interpretant les Decrets 
de I'assemblee constituante de maniere a declarer f eodales proprietes qui n'etaient 
pas, mais qui etaient seulement frappees d'un Cens, on a obei a la Politique et le 
Tresor a perdu une centaine de Millions. II n'y a aucun Raison pour le soumettre 
a cette perte dans les nouveaux Departemens." 

On the same date a similar but more extended communication was dictated 
for the Secretary of State, going more fully into the ways in which the treasury 
had suffered, and repeating almost verbatim the above sentences. It is not, how- 
ever, probable that further research into this matter would reveal any other than 
financial motives. And it is, of course, entirely true that both the state and the 
legitimate rights of private property had been largely and unnecessarily injured 
in the too hasty and sweeping measures of the Revolution. 

""^Corr., XXIII. 62, 

^''Ibid., VIII. 88. 

''Ibid., VIII. 374. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 765 

istence privee, donne a la societe une caution de sa conduite, est 
noble." ^* The acts and utterances of the Hundred Days are, of 
course, untrustworthy, but in this connection it may yet be worth 
while pointing out how constantly he appeals to the Revolution and 
to his own administration as confirming its benefits ; with his earlier 
acts in mind we can scarcely deny that he might well have made 
these appeals with sincerity and good conscience. At least he uses 
no immoderate language when in his proclamation " Aux Habitants 
des Hautes et Basses-Alpes ", March 6, 1815, he claims that his 
return " garantit la conservation de toutes les proprietes ", and 
appeals for their support on the ground that " L'egalite entre toutes 
les classes, et les droits dont vous jouissez depuis vingt-cinq ans, 
et apres lesquels nos peres ont tant soupire, forment aujourd'hui 
une partie de votre existence." ^^ 

The revolutionary breaking-down of the Regime of Privilege 
that is here referred to, was undoubtedly a change that Napoleon 
had much at heart, and with which he identified himself to the full- 
est degree. But it was not in the extreme spirit of rationalistic 
democracy that he regarded this social revolution, and his attitude 
was probably not any more adapted to please the sans-culotte than 
the aristocrat of the Old Regime. He belongs in spirit emphatically 
to the bourgeois revolution, and on various occasions dwells with 
great emphasis and approval upon the leadership thus secured to 
the middle classes. In March, 1805, he writes to the Minister of 
Finance with respect to the formation of those lists of the largest 
tax-payers that were to be the basis of official life. In forming 
these lists, special attention is to be given, he directs, to such as 
have more than one-half of their fortunes in biens nationaux. 

L'intention de I'Empereur est de ne comprendre parmi les 30 plus 
imposes que des personnes appartenant aux families les plus con- 
siderables par leur existence anterieure et presente, par I'etendue de 
leurs liaisons de parente dans le departement, par leurs bonnes moeurs 
et leurs vertus publiques et privees. Quand on dit les families les plus 
considerables, on n'entend pas celles qui jouissaient de plus de con- 
sideration dans I'ancien ordre de choses, a raison de leur extraction, 
quoique Ton n'entende pas non plus que ces circonstances anterieures 
doivent les exclure; mais on entend specialement les bonnes families 
qui appartenaient a ce que Ton appelait autrefois le tiers etat, partie 
la plus saine de la population, et que les liens les plus etroits et les plus 
nombreux attachent au Gouvernement. 

Not more than one-sixth of those included should be persons 
" ayant autrefois joui d'une existence particuHere a raison de leur 

^^Corr., XIV. 401. 
'=/Wd., XXVIII. 6. 



766 Victor Coffin 

naissance ". How much the Emperor had this poHcy at heart is 
shown by the concluding injunction: "La plupart de ces idees 
devront rester tres-secretes ; c'est la pensee tout entiere de I'Em- 
pereur sur cette matiere : aucun acte public, aucune circulaire ne 
doit la laisser penetrer." ^'^ These views are again strongly enun- 
ciated in a letter to Jerome Bonaparte of November 15, 1807, accom- 
panying a new constitution for Westphalia. In this the new king is 
directed to see to it that the Council of State should be mainly 
non-noble, 

toutefois sans que personne s'aperQoive de cette habituelle surveillance 
a maintenir en majorite le tiers etat dans tous les emplois. J'en excepte 
quelques places de cour, auxquelles . . . il faut appeler les plus grands 
noms. Mais que . . . dans vos administrations, la plus grande partie 
des personnes que vous emploierez ne soit pas noble. Cette conduite 
ira au coeur de la Germanie et affligera peut-etre I'autre classe; n'y 
faites point attention. II suffit de ne porter aucune affectation dans 
cette conduite, et surtout de ne jamais entamer de discussions ni faire 
comprendre que vous attachez tant d'importance a relever le tiers etat. 
Le principe avoue est de choisir les talents partout oil il y en 2.^ 

This subject leads logically to a study of Napoleon's attitude to 
the aristocracy, old and new, but manifestly this cannot be attempted 
here with any thoroughness. There is considerable obscurity and 
some appearance of inconsistency in Napoleon's acts and expressions 
in this matter; this probably testifies to long-continued uncertainty 
in his own mind (perhaps I might even venture to say, to conflict 
between principle and policy), and also in all likelihood to the 
forcing of his hand by events. I shall at present confine myself to 
quoting some sentences which show that in founding a new nobility 
or in conceding their distinctions to the old. Napoleon never forgot 
his fundamental system. March 30, 1807, he writes to Louis *of 
Holland of his astonishment at the news that Louis was re-estab- 
lishing the old Dutch nobility in its titles and privileges. " Com- 
ment ", he asks, " serait-il possible que vous ayez eu assez peu de 
discernement pour ne pas sentir que rien n'etait plus funeste a vous, 
a vos peuples, a la France et a moi? Prince frangais, comment 
auriez-vous pu violer vos premiers serments, qui sont de maintenir 
I'egalite parmi vos peuples ? " He adds that Louis will lose the 
love of the Dutch ; " Car, si une noblesse est soutenable dans un 
pays militaire, elle est insoutenable dans un pays de commergants. 
J'estime mieux le dernier boutiquier d'Amsterdam que le premier 
noble de Hollande."^^ But it is only in August of the same year 

^° Corr., X. 205. 
""Ihid., XVI. 173- 
^^ Lecestre, I. 90. 



The Ad^ninistrative Polity of Napoleon I. 767 

that Napoleon writes to Cambaceres with respect to a decree-project 
for the conferring of titles on the most important members of the 
■electoral colleges ; it is pointed out that " I'execution de ce systeme 
est le seul moyen de deraciner entierement I'ancienne noblesse. On 
s'appelle encore due, marquis, baron ; on a repris ses armes et ses 
livrees. II etait facile de prevoir que, si Ton ne remplagait pas ces 
habitudes anciennes par des institutions nouvelles, elles ne tarde- 
raient pas a renaitre." Accordingly the decree, in the desire " effacer 
jusqu'au souvenir des anciermes distinctions et des anciens privi- 
leges qui ont ete reprouves par nos constitutions et par nos lois ", 
proceeds to the establishment of the hereditary titles of duke, count 
.and baron. ^'^ After this step the Emperor was obliged to relax his 
opposition to the policy of Louis in Holland, though he repeats to 
liim, May 6, 1808, that his measures are " fort inutile " and that he 
must draw the line at the creation of princes.*" In 18 10 in a note for 
the Imperial Arch-Chancellor he dwells on the advisability of the 
rapid development of the institution of hereditary titles in order that 
the new nobility may be really national, and repeats that the whole 
-aim of the imperial policy in this matter was " donner des appuis a 
la dynastie presente, faire oublier I'ancienne noblesse ".*^ 

Only a few months later we find steps apparently taken to modify 
the work of Louis in Holland and to reconstruct the Dutch nobility on 
an imperial basis ;*^ there are other indications of a new aim of 
developing an imperial nobility as distinct from national aristocracies, 
and it is probable that the difficulties and uncertainties of this policy 
largely account for inconsistencies in the later years. In a letter to 
Murat of November 20, 1809, Napoleon approves of a step recently 
taken by the Neapolitan government as likely to be "utile a votre 
royaume en regenerant sa noblesse et en entourant le trone de fa- 
milies qui lui devront les distinctions dont elles seront revetues ".*^ 
But a year later he writes that Murat's idea of reconstructing the 
Neapolitan noblesse is ridiculous and that he is to keep it as it is. 

J'ai du reconstituer en France la noblesse, parce qu'il s'etait eleve 
"beaucoup d'hommes qui se sont illustres dans toutes les carrieres, 
civiles et militaires, soit au milieu des dissensions et factions, soit au 
milieu des camps. Ce que j'ai fait en France, et ce que I'Europe a 
approuve, ce serait a Naples une singerie mal appliquee ; laissez dormir 
cela. Quelque chose que vous fassiez, il n'est pas en votre pouvoir, 
avant que de grands evenements illustrent votre pays, de faire oublier 
le passe et de faire dater les choses de I'epoque actuelle." 

''Corr., XV. 487. 

*° Lecestre, I. igo. 

^^ Corr., XX. 410. 

"^Ibid., XXI. 26s, 354. 

*^ De Brotonne, Dern. Lett., I. 447. 

" Corr., XXI. 333- 



768 Victor Coffin 

It is clear from these citations that the policy of Napoleon in 
reg-ard to a titled aristocracy can be accurately weighed only after 
fuller examination. At present I am concerned only to point out 
that there is apparently nothing in this policy that casts doubt on 
the sincerity of his identification of himself and his regime with 
that uplifting of the non-noble classes that had been so manifest a 
result of the Revolution. 

II. 

The other side of my subject is that of the legality or constitu- 
tionality of government in France in the Napoleonic epoch, ^he 
incompleteness with which the Napoleonic system and methods have 
as yet been presented is shown clearly by the haziness of our ideas 
on the exact treatment by Napoleon of the laws and the constitution. 
The ordinary assumption is, I think, that as this constitution and 
these laws were practically dictated by him, and as he had arrived 
at this position of dictatorship by a violent seizure of power, he 
continued to cast aside legal and constitutional restraints whenever 
it seemed desirable, and allowed the forms to have validity only 
when they did not trammel him. At the best, he is represented as 
being restrained only by the statesman's sense of the necessity of 
recognized limits and methods, and by the impulse to establish a 
government of order in contrast to the anarchy and arbitrariness of 
the preceding period. 

Views of this sort are based largely upon the misrepresentations 
of his enemies after his fall ; they find expression in the language in 
which the Senate that had been his chief tool demanded his abdica- 
tion in 1 8 14, or in the words of the pamphleteer who in 18 15 charged 
him with substituting " ta volonte aux lois ".'^^ It is indeed easy to 
give to such a charge a large appearance of truth, and I have no 
intention of denying that Napoleon acted throughout in the convic- 
tion that the national sovereignty was deposited with him, and that 
its exercise could at any moment be extended by him to the consti- 
tutional documents themselves. Further there can be no question 
that through the police individuals were frequently arbitrarily de- 
prived of the benefit of the law. But it will, I think, be found that 
most of these instances of arbitrary treatment of individuals or of 
classes (as in his taking the sons of leading families in France and 
in conquered countries as hostages), are in connection with the 
exceptional situations created by conspiracy or civil war, or are con- 
cerned with those whom, as officials. Napoleon regarded as having 

'^ " Le cri de la France, par un proprietaire de domaines nationaux." Arch» 
Nat., AD X. 21. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 769 

come into special relations with the administration or who were in a 
sense enjoying only a probationary citizenship (^. g., the emigres). 
The power given to the Senate to annul judgments of the courts 
when they were dangerous to the security of the state was very infre- 
quently used ; such a power, however, implies no more than the 
claim as to royal prerogative made and exercised by Charles I., and 
in neither the one case nor the other does it necessarily indicate any 
large degree of illegality or unconstitutionality in administration. 

As a matter of fact, the student of the Napoleonic administration 
will, I think, be surprised at the tenderness shown by Napoleon for 
the constitution, at the vigor and consistency with which he lays 
stress upon strict adherence to the laws and the legal conditions of 
their application. He may be said indeed to pose as a champion 
of legality. We can credit him, I think, with acting on the convic- 
tion that while it was essential that he should have in reserve an 
unquestioned sovereign authority, this authority should remain in 
abeyance as far as possible, and government should normally be 
administered with rigid legality. It was in this temper that he 
wrote to Fouche, September 29, 1809 : " Je reconnais tou jours dans 
vos actes la meme marche ; vous n'avez pas assez de legalite dans la 
tete."*^ We find him frequently raising the question of the exact 
interpretation of the constitution, ordinarily to be sure on points of 
comparative unimportance. In a decision of August 15, 1804, he 
declines to use fully his constitutional opportunities to further ad- 
ministrative ends, and remarks, " L'Empereur ne desire faire usage 
de la faculte de sa prerogative que dans les circonstances d'une plus 
haute importance."*^ In the same year he brings forward a con- 
stitutional objection to a development he is usually represented as 
having much at heart. It is in the note to the Council of State 
quoted above on the project of making maires and their ad joints 
ex-officio part of the municipal councils. " Comment ", he asks, 
" accorde-t-on cette mesure avec le droit de surveillance du conseil 
sur I'administration de la municipalite ? " *^ A little later he shows 
that he is ready to push on centralization as far as the constitution 
will allow; a note of May 2, 1805, to the Minister of the Interior 
on the matter of making presentations for vacancies in a depart- 
mental council declares that " L'Empereur n'est restreint par aucune 
clause constitutionnelle lorsque le conseil n'est pas complet."*^ In 
1806 he requests a report on the justice of the peace of a certain 

« Corr., XIX. 535- 
'■''Ibid., IX. 471. 
*= Ibid., X. \z6. 
''Ibid., X. 364. 



770 Victor Coffin 

commune and asks to be informed " si j'ai le droit de le destituer ".^° 
That at times he was willing to recognize limits even to the 
imperial prerogative would seem to be indicated by the remark in 
a " Note dictee par I'Empereur pour le Ministre de la Police, du 13 
Juin, 1810 ", with regard to Frenchmen who had served foreign 
powers against France, that '' la loi est tellement precise et puissante 
qu'une decision nieme de I'Empereur ne pourrait les soustraire a 
son application."^^ 

The rights of the subject are frequently upheld by the Emperor 
against official tendencies to ignore or diminish them. He writes to 
Fouche, March 5, 1807, with respect to an alleged illegal tax by a 
prefect : " Faites un rapport au Conseil d'fitat, pour qu'il soit pris 
des mesures sur cet objet, car enfin aucune taxation ne doit etre faite 
sur les citoyens que par une loi."°- In 1809 there came to a head 
the very important and long-undetermined question of the condi- 
tions of the expropriation by the state of private property ; the vigor 
with which the Emperor defends private right against administra- 
tive encroachment is quite remarkable. August 21, 1809, he writes 
to Regnier, Grand Judge, that he had received many complaints 
about administrative abuse in this matter, and wished the subject 
investigated in the interests of the security of private property; " il 
est indispensable ", he says, " que les tribunaux puissent informer, 
empecher I'expropriation et enfin recueillir les plaintes et garantir le 
droit des proprietaires contre les entreprises de nos prefets, des con- 
seils de prefecture et autres de nos agents, sous quelque denomi- 
nation." ^^ 

Two weeks later, on receiving the report from Regnier, he 
writes to Cambaceres to protest against Regnier's declaration that, 
while " expropriation force " without indemnity was a violation of 
the Code Napoleon, there was under the law no means of punishing 
officials for such a procedure, and demands that such punishment be 

"^Ihid., XIV. 19. 

''Arch. Nat., AD IV. 909. 

=^Corr., XIV. 372. 

^^ Ibid., XIX. 376. It would seem as if this matter of expropriation had been 
long in an unsettled condition. At first the tendency seems to be to put it fully 
under administrative control, for the " Proces-verbal des Seances du Conseil 
d'fitat " of the 8 Floreal an X. (Arch. Nat. AF* IV. 6) contains the following 
entry : " Le Ministre de I'lnterieur presente un Rapport sur la question de savoir 
si le droit d'expropriation force peut etre donne aux Prefets par une autorisation 
du Gouvernement, sans qu'il soit besoin d'une loi." The report was recommitted. 
It would seem consequently that notwithstanding the advance of the power and 
absoluteness of the new regime there is to be remarked here a decided gain in 
legality; in 1809 the question is not whether the prefect can act without law, but 
whether he can be trusted to apply the law. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 771 

provided for. He declares that expropriation, as the acquisition of 
property, can be accomplished only through judicial channels, and 
that " je ne voudrais faire aucune difference pour Tadministration." 
" Nos lois ", he adds, " me paraissent un assemblage de plans mal 
assortis, inegaux, irreguliers, laissant entre eux de frequentes 
lacunes, et j 'attache une grande importance a joindre ces differents 
elements, a n'en faire qu'un tout, afin de reprimer les abus de I'ad- 
ministration, qui, dans un si grand empire, peuvent etre plus fre- 
quents."^* Nearly a month later he returns to the subject and in- 
forms Cambaceres that he is not satisfied with his memoir on the 
subject, that the interests of expeditious administration is not a 
valid objection to the leaving of the process to the courts, and that 
the legislative section of the Council of State is to prepare a project 
of law on this principle. 

The consciousness shown by Napoleon in this matter as to the 
dangers of bureaucratic tyranny is frequently evident; especially 
does he seem to have been apprehensive of the power of the prefect. 
In 1801 the Minister of the Interior is informed that as some pre- 
fects " se croient autorises a interpreter les actes du Gouverne- 
ment ", as by extending the provisions of arretes, a general order 
is to be issued that when not given special latitude they must con- 
form literally .^^ In 1806 a difficulty occurred between the make 
of Dijon and the prefect of the department, and the Emperor writes 
to Champagny that the prefect has acted without tact or judgment. 

La subordination civile n'est point aveugle et absolue; elle admet 
■des raisonnements et des observations, quelle que puisse etre la hierarchic 
des autorites. . . . Les prefets ne sont que trop enclins a un gouverne- 
ment tranchant, contraire a mes principes et a I'esprit de I'organisation 
administrative. . . . L'autorite des prefets est trop considerable; il y a 
a en craindre Tabus plus que le relachement; et, a cette occasion, vous 
ferez une circulaire aux prefets, pour leur faire connaitre que je n'en- 
tends pas qu'ils impriment aucun arrete contre les officiers municipaux 
et leurs subordonnes. C'est vous qui etes juge des faits d'administration, 
et non la ville ou le departement.°° 

March 7 of the following year, he writes to the president of the 
Section of the Interior of the Council of State with regard to an 
order by a military commander against citizens bearing arms (an 
order which is disapproved as beyond the official's power) that it 
is the aggressions of the prefects that have encouraged the military 
officials to such steps, and that such power could not be given even 
to the prefects since it would be to entrust them with such an au- 

^^ Corr., XIX. 438. 
"•'Ibid.. VII. 29. 
^^Ibid., XII. 311- 



772 Victor Coffin 

thority that " Le repos et la liberte des citoyens dependront done 
de I'exageration ou de I'arbitraire d'un simple administrateur." 
And, he adds, '' Un intendant de departement n'est point un vice- 
empereur ; il n'a qu'une portion de I'administration generale ; il 
n'a d'autre devoir que celui de procurer I'execution des lois et des 
reglements."^'^ On another occasion he points out that the prefects 
were not judicial officials as were the old intendants.^^ 

It is, of course, undeniable that a good deal of the jealous watch- 
fulness that Napoleon directs toward his officials springs from the 
instinct of the organizer, the good business administrator, from a- 
sense of the necessity of maintaining the division of labor and of see- 
ing that the different parts of the machine are occupied with the func- 
tions appropriate to them. It is perhaps primarily this point of 
view that he has when in 1806 he roughly admonishes his brother 
Louis of the necessity of keeping civil and military administration 
distinct. Louis had presumed in his capacity of Grand Constable 
to give orders in France ; " Vous n'entendez rien ", the Emperor 
tells him, " a I'administration civile, et la France ne marche pas 
ainsi. . . . L'administration militaire n'a rien a demeler avec I'ad- 
ministration civile. Si vous gouvernez ainsi votre royaume sans 
aucune division d'autorite, ce sera un vrai chaos." ^^ 

But, ordinarily, much more than this was in the Emperor's mind, 
and it is worth pointing out that he constantly enforced upon the 
military profession a respect for civil life and interests that in that 
age were only too easily forgotten. While on one occasion he 
writes to Fouche that the butcher who had insulted a soldier must 
be severely punished, as " L'exces auquel il s'est porte est le plus 
grand crime que puisse commettre un citoyen ",°° almost all his 
references to these relations show his solicitude in the other direc- 
tion. I have pointed out above his defense of the civil right to 
bear arms against military prohibition, as also his strong disapproval 
in 1804 of the intim.idating attitude of a military commander in 
regard to an electoral college. The superiority under normal condi- 
tions of the civil authority is consistently enforced, as when he 
writes to Marechal Moncey that the gendarmerie must be " a la 
disposition des prefets, comme superieurement charges de la police 
des departements ", that for it to be under military control would 
prevent unity and order. ^'^ In 1808 he writes to Fouche with refer- 

°' Corr., XIV. 401. 
=^ Ibid., XIX. 438. 
*' Lecestre, I. 79. 
^"Corr., XL 10. 
""^Ihid., X. 279. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 773 

ence to some outbreaks on the part of the cadets of the military 
academy at Metz that " le premier devoir de ces jeunes gens est le 
respect a I'autorite civile."^- 

The question of the legality of Napoleon's temper and adminis- 
tration is not to be completely or satisfactorily dealt with without 
following in some degree his relations with the judiciary, his con- 
duct with respect to the application of the law in individual cases. 
If he had the courts sufficiently in his power he could afford to 
frown upon administrative disregard of the law; if he interfered 
with the application of the law by the courts it would evidence an 
even more illegal and dangerous attitude than any degree of support 
to administrative independence of the law. An intelligent gov- 
ernment, we may suppose, is led into arbitrary courses only when 
the courts (as well as the legislature) are inconveniently inde- 
pendent, and it cannot rely on being able to secure judicial modifica- 
tions and exceptions. Possession of the power of securing such 
judicial exceptions and m.odifications is further manifestly a relative 
matter; every executive is vested with more or less pardoning or 
commuting power and is thus regularly possessed of a large meas- 
ure of judicial authority.''^ 

The temptation for the executive power to interfere with the 
courts will depend further on the degree in which the executive is 
vested with legislative control and with means of pressure on judges ; 
a government that monopolizes legislative initiative and can pass 
the laws it wants, or which can intimidate the judges through the 
power of dismissal, manifestly can afford to allow a more or less 
free course to the ostensible operations of the courts.*'* But these 

^''Corr., XVII. 119. 

^^ That this ordinary executive power was recognized in the Napoleonic 
regime as being under restraint is shown by the following entry from the " Pro- 
ces-verbal de la Seance Extraordinaire des Consuls, du 10 Nivose an VIII": 
" 11 est fait lecture d'un memoire relatif aux individus deportes et condamnes 
pour opinions politiques. Renvoye a la section de legislation du Conseil d'fitat, 
pour examiner si pour appliquer a ces individus I'amnistie ou le pardon individuel 
le gouvernement a besoin de I'autorite de la loi." Arch. Nat., AF IV. 911. 

^* The Napoleonic judges were appointed for life, though after 1807 a pro- 
bationary period of five years was required. How far the early government was 
from assuming a complete control of the judiciary is indicated by some extracts 
from the " Proces-verbaux des Seances des Consuls " of 1801. On the 2 Frimaire 
we read : " on renvoya au Conseil d'Etat, section de la legislation, I'examen de 
la question suivante : dans un pays mis hors de la constitution par une loi, le 
Gouvernement peut-il interdire les juges et en nommer d'autres ? " On the 9 
Frimaire the Secretary General of the Conseil d'fitat presented " une decision du 
Conseil d'fitat portant que dans les lieux ou I'empire de la constitution est sus- 
pendu le Gouvernement peut suspendre, mais non destituer les juges." Arch. 
Nat., AF IV. 911- 



774 Victor Coffin 

distinctions do not perhaps carry us very far, especially in the case 
of a government with indefinite prerogative; the present question 
is as to whether Napoleon were an arbitrary or a legal despot, 
whether he did or did not recognize the Reign of Law as well as 
a division of powers, to what degree he conceded rights to the sub- 
ject and left unimpeded the enforcement of these rights by the 
courts. The foregoing pages have shown that he did recognize 
such rights and did attempt to prevent administrative encroachment 
on them; it will be found that he did also repel any interferences 
with the judiciary on the part of administrative officials, and was 
but rarely guilty of such interferences himself."^ 

In scrutinizing this part of the Napoleonic regime it must be 
conceded that in an even greater degree than with respect to other 
parts, the right to make general assertions depends upon an ex- 
haustive tracing of the course of justice. Such an examination is 
perhaps impossible and certainly is not claimed here ; a large amount 
of material, however, has been used, and, as it extends over the 
whole period, it seems reasonable to treat it as representative. The 
instances of references or appeals by Napoleon to his constitutional 
relations to the courts are numerous, and, while they show him at 
times anxious to make the most of his powers, they rarely indicate 
an effort to overstep them. 

I will take up the most significant of these instances chrono- 
logically. In 1800 he requests from the Minister of Justice " un 
rapport sur la maniere dont on pourrait faire casser le jugement 
qui condamne seulement a six ans de fers les trois assassins du 
courrier de Nantes, pris en flagrant delit "J^^ The government was 
at this time desperately contending with brigandage, and interfer- 
ence with the judgment might well have seemed essential. A still 
more exceptional situation was presented by the conspiracies so 
frequently discovered or suspected, and the method in which excep- 
tional measures were taken in regard to them is indicated by the 
following extract from the deliberations of the Conseil d'fitat of 
the II Nivose an IX. The Minister of Police had demanded ex- 
ceptional measures against certain conspirators ; in reply, the council 

^^ One side of the relations between the judicial and administrative officials 
is dealt with in the " Avis du Conseil d'Etat sur la Correspondance des Magis- 
trats . . . avec le Maires et les Commissaires de Police", of August 26, 1806; 
this contains the statement that the interference of the prefects is " tres- 
contraire a I'ordre publique ", and that " si les municipaux comme administrateurs 
ne sont comptables de leurs faits qu'a I'administration superieure, il sont comme 
officiers de police, sous la surveillance et I'autorite immediate des magistrats des 
cours de justice criminelle." Arch. Nat., AD I. 86. 

"=' Corr., VI. 480. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. 775 

considers whether such a step should be " un acte de haute police 

du Gouvernement ou etre convertie en projet de loi ", and resolves 

that the council 

est d'avis que I'acte de haute police dont il s'agit, n'est pas de nature 
d'etre I'objet d'une loi. Neannioins, le conseil, considerant que cet 
acte etant un acte extraordinaire et ayant pour objet le maintien de la 
constitution et de la liberte publique, est, pour cela meme, de la com- 
petence speciale d'un corps qui, par I'esprit de son instruction, doit 
veiller a tout ce qui interesse la conservation du pacte social; que 
d'ailleurs, dans un cas comme celui-ci le refere du Gouvernement au 
Senat conservateur, pour provoquer sur ses propres actes I'examen et 
la decision de ce corps tutelaire, devient, par la force de I'exemple, une 
sauve-garde capable de rassurer, pour la suite, la nation, et de premunir 
le gouvernement lui-meme centre toute acte dangereux a la liberte 
publique, est d'avis que cet acte du Gouvernement. . . . doit devenir la 
matiere d'un Senatus-consulte prononqant sur la question de savoir si 
cette mesure est conservatrice de la constitution.*'^ 

The act in question was the transportation of 131 accused. This 
procedure, of course, brings forward the question of the degree in 
which the Senate, by virtue of its discretionary power of annulling 
judgments in the interests of the public security, was manipulated 
as a means of setting aside judicial restraints. It can, I think, be 
confidently asserted that the Senate was used in this way only under 
the most exceptional conditions and when there was at least some 
color for the idea that the safety of the state was involved.*^^ 

In 1801 we find Napoleon directing the Minister of the Interior 
to make a report as to whether the justices of the peace must be 
residents of their districts f^ he was strongly opposed to such a 
restriction but apparently does not think of overriding it. To this 
institution (which remained elective till 1802), he shows himself 
hostile from the first, and he soon proceeds to modify it by law. 
April 7, 1802, he writes to the Minister of Justice that, as the nomi- 
nations of the justices have been very bad, and, as the constitution 
says that they should be elected by the people, " il convient, pour 
y remedier, de prendre des mesures qui paraissent efficaces, et qui 
seraient de les reduire a leurs fonctions de conciliation et de ne pas 
les payer." ''° But as late as the end of 1806 he was still evidently 
scrupulously respecting the institution, for December 2 we find him 
requesting from the Minister of Justice a report on the justice of 

^■'Arch. Nat, AD I. 86. 

°* It will be remembered that a prominent place was given to a senatorial 
commission appointed to safeguard the liberty of the subject. Of its work I have 
as yet no records. 

^^Corr., VII. 321. 

'"Ibid., VII. 431. 



776 Victor Coffin 

a certain commune, and " que vous me fassiez connaitre si j'ai le 
droit de le destituer "/^ Napoleon, doubtless, mainly disliked the 
direct popular nomination of these officials, and he soon did away 
with it; on the other hand, we find him constantly upholding trial 
by jury. There were occasional suspensions of the jury in localities 
where public sentiment was suspect and political issues likely to 
appear; but, as late as June 24, 1808, he writes with respect to the 
Westphalian constitution : " On peut supprimer le jury d'accusation, 
mais il faut maintenir le jury de jugement dans son integrite; il le 
sera en France, parce que c'est une bonne chose et que la nation le 
desire."'^- He remarks at the same time that while the Italians are 
now " trop passionnes " for the institution, " aussitot que le nouveau 
systeme francais sera concu, je I'adapterai de meme a ITtalie ", and 
adds with respect to the opponents of the institution, " Ceux qui 
veulent la publicite sans jury et sans appel disposent legerement de 
la vie des hommes." 

We have above seen Napoleon seeking in 1800 means of setting 
aside a too moderate judgment; in July, 1803, he responds to the 
request of a prefect for the punishment of an individual wrongfully 
acquitted, that '' La deportation ne peut point etre ordonnee, cet 
individu ayant ete acquitte." '^^ In 1805 the Minister of Justice is 
informed that the Emperor is very dissatisfied with the tribunals 
and with the procureurs generaux ; and it is intimated that steps may 
be taken against one of the latter, for " si je ne suis point maitre 
des tribunaux, je le suis de la nomination de mes procureurs gen- 
eraux."'^* In 1809 Regnier is directed to express the imperial satis- 
faction with the officials of the criminal court of Rouen for resisting 
pressure to show favor to criminals of distinguished family ; " La 
loi ", Napoleon says, " est une pour les citoyens, et la consideration 
de la naissance et de la fortune ne peut jamais etre, pour Sa Majeste 
et les magistrats, un motif pour faire flechir la justice et meme pour 
faire grace; au contraire, elle rend ceux qui les commettent d'autant 
plus coupables qu'ils ont un rang distingue dans la societe."'^^ 

There are indeed indications that toward the end Napoleon was 
tending to assume a higher hand with reference to the judiciary. 
A senatus-consiilte of October 12, 1807, makes provision for a period 
of probation for jydges before life-appointment, and for an exami- 
nation of the lists of existing judges to eliminate the unworthy. By 

''^Corr., XIV. 19. 
'^Ibid., XVII. 328. 
"'^Ibid., VIII. 407. 
"•^Ihid., XI. 27. 
''Uhid., XVIII. 204. 



The Administrative Polity of Napoleon I. j'j'j 

this it was reserved to the Emperor " de prononcer definitivement 
sur le maintien ou la revocation des juges designes dans le rapport 
de la commission "/® In November, 1810, the Emperor sends to 
Cambaceres a proposition that " les ministres d'fitat, qui sont les 
veterans de I'administration . . . fussent conseillers honoraires des 
cours imperiales " ;" that their participation was to be more than 
honorary is shown by the remark that the presence of such men as 
Treilhard and Regnaud would be very advantageous in an important 
impending case. But it is evident that this idea, if at all definite, 
had a limited and political bearing, and can scarcely be supposed to 
indicate any intention of tampering with the ordinary administration 
of justice in France.'^^ 

The only instance of direct interference with the courts disclosed 
by the material used^^ is with regard to an imperial court at Ant- 
werp in 181 3, in a case in which the city (or rather the departmental 
administration) had failed in a prosecution of alleged corrupt octroi 
officials. Napoleon writes, August 5, to Cambaceres that the affair 
is " un scandale public ", and, August 14, says that " Aux circon- 
stances extraordinaires il faut des mesures extraordinaires ; nos con- 
stitutions y ont pourvu." On the same day he writes to the Minister 
of Justice of the shameful corruption shown by the jurors, and pro- 
ceeds, " Dans cette circonstance, quoiqu'il soit dans nos principes 
et dans notre volonte que nos tribunaux administrent la justice avec 
la plus grande independance, cependant, comme ils I'administrent en 
notre nom et a la decharge de notre conscience, nous ne pouvons pas 
ignorer et tolerer un pareil scandale, ni permettre que la corruption 
triomphe et marche tete levee dans nos bonnes villes de Bruxelles 
et d'Anvers." The Minister is, therefore, to order proceedings 

" Arch. Nat., AD I. 44. 

" Corr., XXI. 269. Th.e cours imperiales were the courts of appeal. 

" In a " Note dictee par I'Empereur pour le Grand Juge, Ministre de la Jus- 
tice " of December 11, 1810 (Arch. Nat., AF IV. 909), we find the following order: 
" Le Grand Juge fera mettre en accusation sur les nouvelles charges rhomme qui 
ayant blesse un gendarme qui en perdu la jambe a ete acquitte par le tribunal de 
Namur. Aussitot que le Directeur du jury aura decerne le mandat, le Grand juge 
ordonnera que la procedure soit envoye a Paris, et en rendant compte de le Renvoi 
il proposera de traduire le prevenu devant une commission militaire, attendu que 
le gendarme blesse etait connu pour gendarme par son assassin, que le jury est 
soupgonne de corruption, et qu'il s'agit d'un pays nouvellement frangais." This 
procedure seems unquestionably arbitrary ; and it will be remembered that earlier 
Napoleon had seemed solicitous to keep the police free of military authority. But 
there is some doubt as to whether this order were really dispatched. It does not 
appear either in the Correspondance or in the Supplements. 

" It is rather noticeable that the official publication of the Correspondance 
makes no reference to this affair ; the letters to Regnier and Cambaceres are to be 
found in Lecestre, II. 277-283. 



778 Victor Coffin 

against the jurors, the suspension of the judgment and the re-arrest 
of the accused; then ''en vertu du paragraphe 4 de I'article 55 du 
titre V des Constitutions de I'Empire, en date du 4 aoiit 1802 ", he 
is to present to the Council of State " un projet de senatus-consulte, 
pour annuler le jugement . . . et renvoyer cette affaire a notre 
Cour de cassation, qui designera une cour imperiale par-devant 
laquelle la procedure sera recommencee et jugee, les chambres 
reunies et sans jury." It will be noticed that though the Senate had 
power to issue a senatus-consulte of this nature, the Emperor was 
straining his prerogative in imposing on it and on the courts a defi- 
nite course of procedure, involving suspension of jury-trial. This 
incident, however, was in every way exceptional, and involved pecu- 
liar features of the French administration in Belgium; the Emper- 
or's indignation was based upon police-reports, and seems to be 
aroused mainly in the interests of the people of Antwerp. The case 
was referred to the court of appeal of Douai, but the Empire had 
fallen before a decision was rendered.^" 

I shall not attempt to add any further reflections to the fore- 
going recital of evidence. More extended investigation will very 
probably modify the preliminary conclusions indicated above; but 
it does not seem premature to maintain that Napoleon Bonaparte 
recognized his government to be based upon the Revolution, that 
he administered France for the most part in harmony with revolu- 
tionary principles and results, and that as compared with both the 
Revolution and the Old Regime his administration was distinguished 
by a respect for law. He claimed to be invested by the popular 
will with absolute but responsible power for the organization of 
the state, for the using of its resources in the general welfare, and 
for its defense against its enemies ; but he respected his own organi- 
zation, normally treated the law and the constitution as inviolable, 
and protected the well-defined liberties and opportunities of the citi- 
zen. These liberties and opportunities were in truth subject to 
such far-reaching restrictions as were involved in the strict cen- 
sorship of the press and the prohibition of political agitation; but 
it might not be easy to meet adequately the defense that we may 
suppose Napoleon would make in pointing out that the effects of 
the previous license demanded at least a period of restraint. 

Victor Coffin. 

*° See Revue des Questions Historiques, LVI. 248-271, " Un Prefet Inde- 
pendant sous Napoleon. Voyer d'Argenson a Anvers." 



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